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GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE 
IN REDISTRICTING REFORM 
 HEATHER K. GERKEN* 
This symposium has been largely devoted to whether and how we 
ought to reform our districting process. Today I want to talk about a 
related but often neglected question: if we are serious about reform, 
how do we make it happen? I will thus set aside some of the impor-
tant normative and practical questions associated with what kind of 
redistricting reform we should pursue and focus instead on how to get 
from here to there. 
As we think about getting redistricting reform passed, we ought to 
ask ourselves three questions. First, what should our goals be during 
the 2010 cycle? Second, moving from principle to practice, what spe-
cifically can we do to promote reform during this period? Third, if we 
succeed in getting some traction with reform post-2010, what kind of 
reform proposals should we push? 
My answers to these questions are united by a single theme: the 
key to successful reform is harnessing politics to fix politics. Reform-
ers and academics have typically tried to take the politics out of elec-
tion regulation by creating a nonpartisan districting process.1 Nonpar-
tisan districting is surely a noble cause and a perfectly sensible long-
term goal. But we have allowed that instinct for nonpartisanship to 
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 1. For a sampling of articles that run against this trend, see, e.g., Justin Buchler, The Inevi-
tability of Gerrymandering: Winners and Losers Under Alternative Approaches to Redistricting, 5 
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through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366 (2005); 
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Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6 ELEC. L. J. 184 (2007); Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging 
Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667 
(2006). Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Ac-
quiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002). 
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shape our short and medium-term strategies for achieving reform. 
That is a mistake. Ours is a system where the foxes are guarding the 
henhouse, where legislators set the rules of the game at the same time 
they play it. Needless to say, they are loathe to give up this power. Yet 
most reform strategies turn on asking politicians to ignore their own 
interests and do the right thing. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these strate-
gies have not produced much by way of results. If we are interested in 
getting reform passed, we have to do something more than appeal to 
self-interested political actors to ignore their self-interest. We need to 
realign the incentives of the foxes with those of the hens, to redirect 
competitive political energies into healthier channels. 
GOALS FOR 2010 
Political self-interest is the key barrier to reform—and the key to 
thinking about getting around that barrier. If you want to get reform 
passed, you need an environment where it’s possible to do so. Right 
now, we do not have such an environment, precisely because self-
interested politicians have no reason to push for change. Until we fig-
ure out how to change current political incentives, we are unlikely to 
make much headway in districting reform. 
Reform is always tough to pass, of course. But districting reform is 
even more challenging. Ask anyone who works for a good governance 
group—a “goo goo,” as they are affectionately known. Redistricting is 
one of those rare areas where the people who know the most about 
reform and care the most about reform are the politicians who op-
pose it. 
Politicians would, of course, have reason to care about districting 
reform if voters held their feet to the fire. But voters tend to care 
about substantive outcomes, not process reforms. That leaves politi-
cians to do as they please on the districting front. And it rarely occurs 
to partisans to give up the power to draw their own districts, the 
power to choose their constituents before their constituents can 
choose them. Even our goo-goo-in-chief—Barack Obama, a longtime 
advocate of election reform—took advantage of this legislative perk 
when he was in Illinois. In 2001, Obama worked with fellow Democ-
rats to draw his “ideal map,” uniting his “North Side fund-raising base 
and his South Side political base.”2 While some thought the story tar-
                                                     
 2. Ryan Lizza, Making It: How Chicago Shaped Obama, THE NEW YORKER, July 21, 
2008, at 61, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/21/080721fa_fact_lizza. 
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nished Obama’s reform credentials,3 anyone with redistricting experi-
ence took it as proof that Obama was a pragmatist who would not al-
low himself to get rolled. The fact is that politicians will take advan-
tage of their power for as long as voters let them. 
Sometimes a cause can be saved by a “Big Bang,” a scandal big 
enough to force legislators to do something. But in redistricting, the 
real scandal is how districting works—backroom deals, egregious self-
dealing, vicious partisanship—and it has never prompted the public to 
raise a collective eyebrow, let alone a political ruckus. Absent a sex-
for-boundary-lines exchange, it is hard to see a Big Bang moment on 
the horizon. 
How, then, should we think about reform in the short term? In my 
view, the best we can hope to get out of the 2010 cycle is what I call a 
“here to there” solution.4 In election reform, we almost always have a 
good sense of the “here” (the problems with our current system) and 
lots of ideas about the “there” (how things ought to work in the fu-
ture). But we rarely spend time thinking about the “here to there”—
how to create an environment in which meaningful reform might ac-
tually take root. Instead, we tend to announce reform proposals as if 
we could “just add water” and they would magically get passed. 
The problem is that we cannot just add water. Reform battles are 
usually fought on quite hostile terrain. We need to spend more time 
imagining how to change that terrain. We should think harder about 
the small-scale interventions that would make bigger, better reform 
more likely. “Here to there” proposals are not about the journey’s 
end; they are about smoothing the path that leads there. 
It is a bit surprising that we have a “here to there” problem in 
election reform. After all, most arguments for election reform depend 
on a single premise: process shapes substance.5 Academics are quick 
                                                     
 3. For a sampling of such views from across the political spectrum, see  Isaac Choitner, 
Obama’s Chicago Days, THE PLANK, July 16, 2008, http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-plank/obamas-
chicago-days; Tom Elia, Another Piece to the Obama Puzzle?, THE NEW EDITOR, July 14, 2008, 
http://theneweditor.com/index.php?/archives/8271-Another-Piece-to-the-Obama-Puzzle.html; 
Jim Geraghty, Obama’s Changed Tune on Redrawing District Lines, THE CAMPAIGN SPOT, July 
14, 2008, http://www.nationalreview.com/campaign-spot/9309/obamas-changed-tune-redrawing-
district-lines; Gerrymandering Movie Blog, http://gerrymanderingmovie.com/news/?p=20&c=2 
(July 16, 2008). 
 4. For further development of this idea in the context of election administration reform, 
see HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW 
TO FIX IT (2008). The next few paragraphs are drawn from that book. 
 5. The notion has become so central that it serves as the opening argument in one of the 
field’s major casebooks: SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 1 (3d ed. 
2007) (“institutional arrangements . . . influence the range of possible outcomes that formal 
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to tell you that the structure of our political process (campaign fi-
nance law, redistricting rules) helps determine the substance of our 
policies (who gets elected, what gets passed). But we do not apply that 
lesson to election reform. The structure of our political process also 
determines what kind of election reform gets passed. Or, in the case 
of the United States, this structure creates an environment where pre-
cious little gets passed. 
The “here to there” problem is not confined to the academy. Blue 
ribbon panels and good governance groups often propose overhauling 
our election system or enacting laundry lists of proposals. Though re-
formers who labor in the political trenches are painfully aware that 
we cannot “just add water” to get change passed, most are unable to 
spend much time on fashioning a political environment that is recep-
tive to change. 
Reformers, of course, spend a lot of time on the “here to there” for 
specific projects. They work tirelessly to build support for this or that 
proposal—educating the public, lobbying officials, filing lawsuits. But 
good governance groups lack the resources they need to grapple with 
the “here to there” problem writ large. That is because reformers are 
beholden to funders. And funders tend to favor big over small, end 
goals over interim solutions, silver bullets over institutional tweaks, 
substantive proposals over procedural fixes. As one reform advocate 
ruefully told me, “process is not sexy.”6 And the “here to there” ques-
tion is process squared—changing the reform process to make more 
significant procedural reforms possible. For funders anxious to see 
concrete results—bills passed, reports issued, news articles written—
smoothing the path for election reform looks like a nebulous project 
indeed. The result is that the people who know the most about how 
the reform process actually works have the fewest opportunities to 
change it. 
In my view, there is little point in continuing to fight the same 
fight on redistricting reform unless we change the terrain on which 
the battle is fought. We should take a step back and figure out how to 
create an environment that is more receptive to change generally. 
Consider, for instance, the subject of one of this conference’s pan-
els: “Is There a Way to Design an Apolitical Redistricting Process?” It 
would be great if a nonpartisan districting process were created. The 
                                                                                                                          
elections and subsequent policymaking can achieve”). 
 6. Telephone Interview with Justin Levitt, Counsel, Democracy Section, Brennan Center 
for Justice at New York University School of Law (June 14, 2007). 
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harder question, though, is how we get from here to there. Nonparti-
san bureaucracies do not spring, like Athena, from the head of a god. 
They get created by a somebody, usually a political somebody. And 
that returns us to the “here to there” problem. 
You can see, then, why I think it would be quite impressive if we 
would come up with a few “here to there” solutions for the 2010 redis-
tricting cycle. Those outside the districting world might think that a 
“here to there” solution seems quite modest compared to the broad-
gauged reform that we need. But my bet is that most of the people 
who have experience with redistricting would think my proposal is 
still pretty ambitious. The reason is simple. In most places, it is too late 
to hope for serious districting reform before 2010. The party that con-
trols the levers of change is usually the one that will control redistrict-
ing and thus has no incentive to pass reform. If we get real reform 
anytime soon, it is likely to come immediately after the districting cy-
cle, when the parties look to 2020 and cannot be sure who will be on 
top when the next cycle arrives. The best we can hope for, then, is to 
create an environment in which reform might happen when the par-
ties are behind the veil of ignorance and still stinging (we hope) from 
the bad publicity about the last redistricting cycle. If our “here to 
there” approaches manage to put some constraints on the most egre-
gious forms of gerrymandering during the 2010 cycle, all the better. 
REFORM STRATEGIES AVAILABLE FOR 2010 
If we are searching for a “here to there” solution for 2010, what 
kind of approaches are available? Let me start with what we should 
not do. If I may offer a prayer to the god of districting: please let it not 
be another public education campaign. In 1970, we had a public edu-
cation campaign. In 1980, we had a public education campaign. In 
1990 and 2000, we had public education campaigns. If it is true that 
the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again 
while expecting a different result, then perhaps good governance re-
formers ought to be checking in with their shrinks. Public education 
campaigns have not gotten traction on this issue; they have not 
changed political incentives. A public education campaign is, without 
question, a crucial factor in the reform calculus. But, standing alone, it 
is not enough. 
In thinking about the “here to there,” then, we need to remember 
that political self-interest is not just the problem for redistricting re-
form; it may also be the solution. That is because political self-interest 
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is a double-edged sword.7 Scholars and reformers familiar with its 
perverse consequences in the elections arena tend to lament its exis-
tence, but political self-interest is also the engine that fuels a vibrant 
political system. The key is to figure out how to align the interests of 
partisans with the interests of voters, to redirect political energies into 
healthier channels. The key is to harness politics to fix politics. 
Stated in these terms, the idea seems unobjectionable, maybe even 
banal. Of course, one thinks, we should be attentive to partisan self-
interest in thinking about reform. But while most agree with the basic 
idea, scholars have not been sufficiently attentive to all of its implica-
tions. This is an idea worked out in the “apps,” an idea whose signifi-
cance becomes apparent only in the application, only when one digs 
into the questions of institutional design and election reform that are 
the bread-and-butter of elections scholarship. 
Open-Source Software. Let me talk about specifics—the “apps” 
available to harness politics to fix politics in the redistricting context. 
The first and most essential prerequisite for change is to release user-
friendly, open-source districting software of the sort that Michael 
McDonald and Micah Altman have created,8 along with the necessary 
redistricting data (both the Census data and relevant political data). 
The hope would be that the “grass tops”—civil rights organizations, 
good governance groups—could use this technology to draw district-
ing plans that would shame state legislatures into doing a better job 
drawing district lines. I cannot emphasize how important it is to have 
this software. Most of the other reforms I describe here turn on its ex-
istence. 
Redistricting Contests. If we want to get a bit more ambitious, we 
could try something like the Ohio redistricting contest, a beta version 
of which was run last year by the Secretary of State with the help of 
several nonprofits and academics.9 Ohio residents were invited to 
draw districting plans, and a set of “winners” was announced at the 
                                                     
 7. For a more in-depth development of this idea, see Heather K. Gerken & Michael Kang, 
Harnessing Politics to Fix Politics, in RACE, REFORM, AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: 
RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Guy-Uriel Charles et al. eds)(forthcoming 
2010). 
 8. Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated Redistricting, 34 J. 
STATISTICAL SOFTWARE (forthcoming 2010). 
 9. For excellent discussions of this process, see Steven Huefner, Don’t Just Make Redis-
tricters More Accountable to the People, Make Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 37 (2010), and Justin Levitt, Drawing the Lines in Ohio: A Big Step Forward, Brennan 
Center for Justice, June 24, 2009, http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/drawing_the_lines 
_in_ohio_a_big_step_forward. 
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end of the contest. Each winning plan, perhaps unsurprisingly, looked 
a good deal better than the plan the legislature had created. Though 
the data were outdated and the rules simplified, this beta version of a 
redistricting contest gave a sense of how public attention could be di-
rected toward the redistricting process. The contest did not just draw 
people into the process; it also ginned up useful publicity, all the while 
producing a set of maps that could serve as baselines for evaluating 
the legislative plan. 
Open Redistricting Project. More ambitious still is an idea pro-
posed by Travis Crum to create an “Open Redistricting Project.”10 
Imagine the Ohio contest run through a social networking program. 
The goal would be to create a site where citizens could draw their 
own districting plans. Then, using social networking tools, the project 
would produce an ideal plan through an iterative, wiki-based process, 
with each new contributor improving on the plans created by the last. 
The hope would be to produce plans that the net roots would then 
champion and put pressure on politicians to produce a plan that is just 
as good. Here again, you can see how the open redistricting project 
might soften the terrain for reform—you generate press, create op-
portunities for public input, and produce a baseline plan. 
Model Districting Commissions. Still more ambitious is a proposal 
I have made: creating model districting commissions to run in tandem 
with—or shadow—the legislative districting process.11 This idea has 
been picked up by the Joyce Foundation, which will fund this process 
in two states.12 
The idea behind these commissions is that they would (1) model 
what an inclusive and transparent districting process looks like, and 
(2) produce a districting plan or plans that would serve as a baseline 
for assessing what the legislature ultimately puts forward. The model 
commissions would, in effect, serve as a challenge to the legislature by 
showing how districting ought to work. 
                                                     
 10. Travis Crum, The Open Redistricting Project, BALKINIZATION, Apr. 6, 2009, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/04/openredistricting-project.html. 
 11. Heather K. Gerken, Out of the Shadows: Private Redistricting Plans Can Help Over-
come Lawmakers’ Partisanship, LEGAL TIMES, May 5, 2008, at 62, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005634464&hbxlogin=1; Heather K. 
Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1614 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, Getting 
From Here to There in Election Reform: A Trio of Ideas (unpublished manuscript on file with 
the author) (April 12, 2010). 
 12. The Joyce Foundation, Grant List, http://www.joycefdn.org/content.cfm/grant-
list?GrantID=32086&GrantDetails=1 (last visited April 18, 2010). 
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The proposal is quite flexible, easily adapted to local conditions, 
and builds naturally on the other ideas I have just outlined. The dis-
tricting commission could be composed of citizens or experts or 
stakeholders or respected nonpartisans. In producing the baseline 
plan, the commission might adopt a model akin to Sam Hirsch’s redis-
tricting proposal, which asks stakeholders to compete to produce the 
best plan.13 Or the commission could invite members of the public to 
submit their own plans, like the Ohio redistricting contest.14 Or it 
could adopt an interactive wiki-based approach for choosing the best 
plan, as Travis Crum has suggested.15 Or the commission could simply 
ask a group of nonpartisan experts to draw up a bunch of plans and 
choose among them. All that the model commission requires is a 
process that is transparent and open, which produces a plan to com-
pete with the legislative one. 
Note that this is a quintessentially “here to there” proposal. It 
does not pry redistricting out of the hands of partisans (reformers’ 
most ambitious goal), nor does it place direct constraints on self-
interested gerrymandering (the more realistic goal of reform). In-
stead, it pushes toward those goals by smoothing the path that leads 
there. Model commissions are modest reforms designed to make big-
ger, better reform possible. Thus, while the model commission should 
place some modest constraints on the districting process in the short-
term, its core purpose is to build the case for change in the medium-
term. And by building the case for change in the medium-term, keep 
in mind what I just observed—that there are at least two major aims 
of redistricting reform. The most ambitious version is to take redis-
tricting entirely out of the hands of partisans. The more realistic is to 
place some substantive constraints on districting. Model commissions 
move us closer to each. 
Short-term effects. In the short-term, a model districting commis-
sion can be used to shame legislators engaged in egregious gerryman-
dering. It should work for the simplest of reasons: it is always better to 
show that you can do something than claim you can. Typically, the 
mantra of reformers in redistricting is “do more, do better.” This kind 
of argument, however, is hard for the public to process and journalists 
                                                     
 13. Sam Hirsch, A Proposal for Redistricting Reform: A Model State Constitutional 
Amendment, delivered at the American Mathematical Society’s Special Session on the Redis-
tricting Problem (Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://www.americansforredistrictingreform. 
org/html/documents/HirschRedistrictingPaperforAmerMathSociety.pdf. 
 14. Levitt, supra note 9. 
 15. Crum, supra note 10. 
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to report. With a model commission, in lieu of vague admonitions that 
the process should be “more open” or “more inclusive,” reformers 
could identify a process that is more open and more inclusive. In lieu 
of atmospheric claims that the legislature could have produced a “bet-
ter plan,” reformers could show what a better plan looks like. 
For the cynics who think that legislators simply cannot be shamed 
on this front, I should note that the model plan poses a more concrete 
threat to politicians, and here I offer a lesson from my prior life as a 
litigator. Politicians fear litigation; it poses the risk that the redistrict-
ing deal they brokered will be blown up by a judge. And judges are 
always on the hunt for a neutral yardstick. For this reason, the model 
plan will inevitably be featured in any lawsuit challenging the legisla-
tive plan. The model plan should therefore reduce at least some of the 
incentives for engaging in the worst forms of redistricting. 
Smoothing the path for reform. In the medium term, a model dis-
tricting commission should build the case for future reform along two 
dimensions. First, it is a sensational press vehicle for driving home the 
one argument about redistricting that gets traction with the public: 
legislators should not draw their own districts. Citizen commissions 
are especially likely to draw the public’s attention to the problem. The 
press cannot resist a human interest story, and the phrase “citizen 
commission” is an evocative shorthand for voters.16 Moreover, any 
party dissatisfied with the process is likely to draw attention to the 
model districting plan, which means that partisan competition will 
serve as an engine for publicizing the problem. 
Second, the model commission should push toward a more serious 
debate about how we might impose substantive constraints on dis-
tricting (an issue that has thus far caused our regulator-in-chief—the 
Supreme Court—to throw up its hands17). A well-run model process 
should make clear that it is possible to impose substantive constraints 
on redistricting without mandating witless districting. 
Right now many think that our choice on the redistricting front is 
either witless districting or a legislative free-for-all. There has been a 
long and not-so-merry war between reformers who think that the key 
                                                     
 16. See, e.g., Fred Cutler, et al., Deliberation, Information, and Trust: The British Colum-
bian Citizens’ Assembly as Agenda Setter, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 166, 173–
82 (Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse, eds., 2008). 
 17. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to 
a political gerrymander on the grounds that no judicially manageable standard exists for evalu-
ating such claims). 
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is to place objective constraints on the districting process (the kinds of 
metrics you could just plug into a computer) and those who insist that 
districting cannot be reduced to a formula. Objective criteria are su-
perficially attractive, but there are always trade-offs in districting. A 
strict compactness requirement, for instance, can cause salient politi-
cal groups to be underrepresented.18 Creating more competitive dis-
tricts may result in a legislature that is less representative.19 While ob-
jective criteria are intuitively appealing (and far easier to get en-
acted), they fail to capture the reasons why we create districts in the 
first place. Districting necessarily involves discretionary decisions 
about how to weigh attractive normative principles against one an-
other. You can conceal those discretionary decisions by plugging them 
into a computer, but someone is still making them. 
You can see the problem for those who worry about witless dis-
tricting but still want to impose constraints on the process. The mo-
ment that debates get an inch deep, reformers have to admit that dis-
tricting involves choices.  That admission, in turn, prompts defenders 
of the status quo to insist that if this all involves judgment calls any-
way, we should just leave redistricting to democratically elected repre-
sentatives. Reformers on this side of the debate hardly want to con-
tinue with the legislative free-for-all. But the only alternative that 
seems to exist is extremely hard to achieve: a fully nonpartisan proc-
ess that takes districting entirely out of the hands of politicians. 
There is a middle ground in this debate.20 The fact that districting 
cannot be reduced to a mathematical formula does not mean that it 
must remain unconstrained. While any sensible districting process will 
produce a range of plans, that range has limits, and many legislative 
plans fall well outside that range. That is what a model commission 
should demonstrate. 
The key to constraining self-interested legislators is not to identify 
the perfect plan, but to prevent legislators from adopting plans at the 
                                                     
 18. Micah Altman, Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on Partisan 
Gerrymanders, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 989, 989 (1998). 
 19. See, e.g., Persily, supra note 1, at 650 (collecting sources). 
 20. The next three paragraphs draw entirely upon conversations I have had with Dan 
Goroff and work done by Michael McDonald and Micah Altman. See Micah Altman, The Com-
putational Complexity of Automated Redistricting: Is Automation the Answer?, 23 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 81 (2007); Altman & McDonald, supra note 8; Micah Altman, et al., 
From Crayons to Computers: The Evolution of Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. 
COMP. REV. 334 (2005); Micah Altman, et al., Party Lines: Competition, Partisanship, and Con-
gressional Redistricting, in PUSHBUTTON GERRYMANDERS? HOW COMPUTING HAS CHANGED 
REDISTRICTING (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce Cain, eds. 2005).  
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extremes. There are always trade-offs between districting criteria, but 
it is possible to find lots of plans that do well along a variety of sensi-
ble dimensions. And we can now make meaningful comparisons be-
tween districting plans, thanks largely to advances in districting soft-
ware pioneered by Micah Altman and Michael McDonald.21 
The model districting commission, then, would find that sweet 
spot—something roughly akin to what social scientists would call the 
“Pareto optimal frontier”22—where you have done as well as you can 
do along some set of basic requirements. Imagine, for instance, that 
someone comes forward with a plan that features three Latino-
opportunity districts and high compactness scores, but gives Democ-
rats a disproportionate share of legislative seats. Another person 
might come forward with a plan that has the same number of Latino-
opportunity districts and the same compactness scores, but is fairer 
along partisan lines. If no one can beat that plan, you have reached 
the Pareto frontier. 
I do not mean to suggest that the general public is going to be 
moved by talk of Pareto optimality. But the basic point—that there is 
a range of reasonable plans, and the public should not accept a plan 
that falls outside that range—is easy to grasp. It is not just easy for the 
public to grasp; it is also easy for judges to grasp, a fact that may mat-
ter a good deal given how much election reform ultimately emanates 
from the courts. In any case, regardless of the source of regulation, if 
legislators in 2020 were forced to work within a sensible range of dis-
tricting criteria, that would be a huge step forward. 
The question of legitimacy. One might ask whether we need a 
model commission to impose this sort of constraint on legislators. 
Why not use Ohio’s districting contest or Travis Crum’s wiki-based 
approach? Or why not just have a political scientist crunch the num-
bers? 
While all of these ideas are quite promising, they lack one feature 
that the model commission possesses: legitimacy. The model commis-
sion provides not just a plan, but a process. Dismissing a model com-
mission’s proposed plan is much harder than sidestepping plans 
                                                     
 21. See generally Altman & McDonald, supra note 8. 
 22. Pareto optimality is, of course, a term of art referring to individual well-being. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1138 (7th ed. 1999).  It is used to describe a situation, in which resources 
have been distributed in such a way that no one can be made better off without making some-
one else worse off. Here, I am using the term loosely to describe a situation in which one cannot 
improve on one districting criterion without reducing a plan’s score for another criterion. 
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drawn by private individuals or public interest groups. The model 
commission’s process thus lends legitimacy to the plan the process 
produces. 
Think, for instance, what happened during the 2000 redistricting 
cycle. Redistricting software was cheap enough that some civil-rights 
and good-governance groups drew plans to compete with the legisla-
tures. Unfortunately, these plans did not get much traction. In Cali-
fornia, for instance, a “unity” plan drawn by civil-rights groups “sat on 
the shelf,” as one participant ruefully observed, because it looked like 
it came from just one set of constituents rather than “the people.”23 
Similarly, redistricting contests—run like that in Ohio or via a wiki—
still require someone to set the criteria by which the plan is being 
judged, running you again into the question of legitimacy. By both 
modeling a fair process and producing a baseline plan, the model dis-
tricting commission gives people a reason to regard the baseline plan 
as something more than special pleading. 
Citizen commissions are particularly useful in this regard. Reform 
proposals are always subject to political deflection. Political oppo-
nents dismiss those behind the reform as “partisan,” “ivory tower aca-
demics,” or “sore losers.” But no politician worth her salt is going to 
levy such accusations at a group of everyday citizens. Moreover, vot-
ers always used shorthand in evaluating policy—they look to the word 
“Democrat” or Republican” in lieu of working through all the policy 
details. The phrase “citizen commission” provides a potentially useful 
shortcut here.24 
REFORM POST 2010 
Finally, let’s say it works. Imagine we managed to gin up enough 
publicity and political pressure so that some politicians in some places 
are in the mood for change. What kind of change should reformers 
propose? 
Here, let me offer another prayer to the god of redistricting: 
please let it not be a proposal that takes redistricting entirely away 
from the politicians. If you look into the intellectual filing cabinets of 
most reform groups and academics, my guess is that is just the kind of 
proposal you will find. 
                                                     
 23. Email from anonymous reformer, dated July 29, 2009. 
 24. Supra text accompanying note 16; see generally Heather K. Gerken & Doug B. Rand, 
Creating Better Heuristics for the Presidential Primary:  The Citizen Assembly, 125 POL. SCI. Q. 
(forthcoming 2010). 
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The impulse to move to a nonpartisan process is perfectly under-
standable. Anyone involved in election reform is familiar with the 
problem with which I began—foxes guarding henhouses. We all know 
what happens when we leave the regulation of politics to politics. 
Most reform proposals go immediately from the diagnosis—that poli-
tics is the disease—to the conclusion that the only viable cure is to rid 
the process of politics, to move the power to regulate elections en-
tirely outside of the political system. 
Maybe this will happen. I am perfectly willing to accept that if we 
had magic wands, waving them to produce a nonpartisan districting 
process would be a perfectly sensible idea. My worry, though, is that it 
is quite unrealistic to expect a reform of this magnitude after the 2010 
cycle. Given political realities, it is too far, too fast. My guess—and it is 
just a guess—is that post-2010, we are more likely to have a shot at 
developing redistricting reform that goes some way toward nonparti-
sanship but still leaves room for politicians to have some influence 
over the process. That strikes me as the first step toward a healthy dis-
tricting process. 
For this reason, I would like to see a diverse set of proposals in re-
formers’ hands when the time comes. For instance, we ought to be de-
veloping more proposals like Sam Hirsch’s baseball-style arbitration 
process—with each party competing to submit the best plan, as 
judged by a neutral arbitrator.25 The advantage of Hirsch’s proposal is 
that while it will not produce a plan that the parties like, it will pro-
duce a plan that they can live with, something that might help reform-
ers wring the last few votes that they need to pass the proposal. 
Or perhaps we should push for something like Michael Kang’s 
proposal that redistricting plans be approved by voters via referen-
dum before being put in place.26 Here, politicians control what kind of 
plan gets put forward. But they will have to sell it to the public, which 
means that they will have to take some constraints on gerrymandering 
into account, lest they push too far and lose public support. 
Or perhaps there should be an officially blessed model districting 
process to shadow the legislative process for every cycle, much as 
some countries have shadow governments to shame the party in 
power into doing better.27 Even a model commission that lacked 
power could constrain the process by identifying where the Pareto 
                                                     
 25. See generally Hirsch, supra note 13. 
 26. See generally Kang, supra note 1. 
 27. Cf. Elmendorf, supra note 1 (discussing advisory commissions and election reform). 
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frontier is and putting pressure on politicians to satisfy some basic set 
of districting requirements. 
I would even be happy with efforts to make the redistricting proc-
ess more transparent,28 as modest a goal as that might seem. By giving 
public interest groups greater access to the process and making it eas-
ier for reporters to tell a story about it, these proposals might also 
prod politicians to do better. 
To return to the theme with which I began, proposals like these all 
harness politics to fix politics—they are all solutions for getting us 
from “here” to “there.” Hirsch re-channels the parties’ energies into 
crafting the best districting plan rather than the harshest gerryman-
der. Kang pushes elites to sell their plans to the public, enlisting their 
help in framing the issues and putting redistricting on the public’s 
agenda. Model districting commissions give voters a shorthand in 
sorting out reform debates and push toward both procedural and sub-
stantive districting reform. Even more transparency may help in the 
long term as the Google generation comes into its own. All of these 
proposals offer something that politicians might be able to live with, 
and yet, at the same time, push them to think about something other 
than pure self-interest. 
These suggestions might seem quite disappointing to those who 
want to shield districting entirely from the taint of politics. But even 
the much-praised Iowa process is not actually fully nonpartisan. It is 
an iterative process that leaves the legislature an opportunity to have 
input, even to pull the plug. Indeed, even if one had the good fortune 
to encounter a sufficient concentration of reform-minded legislators 
ready to create a nonpartisan districting commission—or a magic 
wand—the problem of capture remains in the long term. Indeed, 
there is a cottage industry in administrative law devoted to identifying 
the many ways in which administrative independence can be under-
mined by legislative self-interest.29 
                                                     
 28. For an excellent example, see Campaign Legal Center, MODEL LEGISLATION FOR 
TRANSPARENCY OF REDISTRICTING PROCESS, http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/ 
attachments/2058.pdf. 
 29. Much of this literature builds on the seminal work of the “McNollgast” trio concerning 
the use of procedural rules and institutional design strategies to control agencies. See Matthew 
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); see also Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shep-
sle, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Ad-
ministrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Response to Agency Costs, 75 VA. 
L. REV. 499 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Admin-
istrative Agencies, 8 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bu-
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Politics, in other words, is the likely terrain for this battle no mat-
ter what path one chooses. And given that any reform proposal has to 
survive in the Serbonian bog that we call politics, maybe it is not such 
a bad idea to introduce a little bit of politics into our reform proposals 
in order to inoculate them against the more serious diseases circulat-
ing in that swamp. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
reaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade 
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